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As noted in previous survey articles,' Texas courts have generally been
hesitant to interpret the Texas Constitution as providing greater protec-
tions than its federal counterpart. 2 However, a significant exception oc-
curred during the Survey period in the context of the so-called inventory
search. In Autran v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals rewrote Texas
law on inventory searches. 3
Autran was stopped by the Orange County Sheriff's department for a
traffic violation. After providing suspicious and inconsistent responses to
questions posed by the sheriff, Autran was arrested for failure to drive
within a single lane. The sheriff conducted an inventory search of the
vehicle in which he opened a cardboard box, a shopping bag and an ice
chest. The search revealed cocaine and a large sum of cash.
Autran moved to suppress the incriminating evidence, arguing that it
was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9
of the Texas Constitution. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Au-
tran's claim of a Fourth Amendment violation, holding that, since the
inventory was conducted pursuant to a routine sheriff's department pol-
icy, it was permissible.4 This ruling is consistent with a long line of federal
authority5 that justifies the inventory search on the basis of police safety
as well as a rebuttal to claims of lost or stolen property.
But the court then went forward with a five factor analysis of whether
the search was permissible under the Texas Constitution. The Court ar-
ticulated the factors as follows: (1) textual examination of the constitu-
tional provision, (2) the framer's intent, (3) history and application of the
constitutional provision, (4) comparable jurisprudence from other states;
and (5) practical policy considerations.6
A review of these factors convinced a plurality of the Court that the
Texas Constitution afforded greater protection with respect to inventory
searches than the federal constitution.7 Relying primarily on jurispru-
dence from other states, including California, South Dakota, and Alaska,
the Court rejected the notion that inventory searches conducted pursuant
1. See, e.g., Thomas M. Melsheimer & Thomas B. Walsh IV, Criminal Procedure:
Confession, Search & Seizure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REv. 977 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Muniz v. State, 865 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, writ ref'd).
The possibility of interpreting the Texas Constitution to provide broader protection was
recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
3. 887 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994, no writ).
4. Id. at 35-36.
5. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
6. Autran, 887 S.W. 2d at 37.
7. Id. at 41-42.
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to a standard policy were presumptively reasonable. Speaking for the
plurality, Justice Baird wrote:
[W]e hold that art. I, §9 provides a privacy interest in closed contain-
ers which is not overcome by the general policy considerations un-
derlying an inventory.... The officers [sic] interest in the protection
of appellant's property as well as the protection of themselves from
danger and the agency from claims of theft, can be satisfied by re-
cording the existence of and describing and/or photographing the
closed or locked container.8
Justices Campbell, Clinton, Maloney and Meyer concurred in the result
only. These justices would have held that the inventory search of Au-
tran's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. Justice McCormick filed
a vigorous dissent characterizing the plurality opinion as a "slippery slope
of judicial activism" and "unprincipled, result-oriented decision-mak-
ing."9 If the divisions in Autran are a harbinger of things to come, the
Court of Criminal Appeals will not quietly or easily expand the constitu-
tional protections of Article I, section 9.
B. INVESTIGATORY DETENTION
It is axiomatic that the police may briefly detain an individual for the
purpose of investigating whether a crime has occurred, even when the
police lack probable cause to make an arrest.10 The parameters of this
type of detention, known as a Terry stop, were the focus of several cases
during the Survey period.
In Shelby v. State," Houston police stopped Shelby and conducted a
"pat-down" search based on the following circumstances: (1) Shelby was
wearing a heavy jacket on a warm night; (2) he was traveling by foot in a
high-crime area; (3) in the officer's experience, he had encountered de-
fendants in the area with firearms, and (4) the officer knew, based on
experience, that drug dealers often carry weapons.
The Houston court found these circumstances inadequate to support
the officer's detention and search which led to the discovery of cocaine in
Shelby's pocket.' 2 Attempting to reinforce the necessary limits on the
expanding use of investigative detentions in high crime areas, the court
emphasized that "[tlhe mere reputation of the high crime area where de-
tainees are seen, without more, cannot serve as the basis for an investiga-
tive detention. ''13
That the propriety of any investigative detention is, of necessity, an
extremely fact specific inquiry as was demonstrated in the El Paso Court
of Appeals decision in Cardwell v. State.14 In this case, El Paso police
8. Id.
9. Id. at 43.
10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11. 888 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ ref'd).
12. Id. at 234.
13. Id.
14. 890 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ ref'd).
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detained Ms. Cardwell under the following circumstances: (1) police ob-
served "some type of transaction" among Cardwell, a companion known
by the police as a drug user, and two Hispanic men; (2) the transaction
was conducted in an area known for drug trafficking; and (3) the police
had received a tip that a large drug transaction would occur in the area
that day.15 The subsequent detention and frisk of Cardwell revealed a
small quantity of cocaine in a folded up piece of paper.
The El Paso court concluded that the Terry stop was proper because it
was based on reasonable suspicion. 16 The search of Cardwell, however,
exceeded the scope of a permissible pat down search because the officers
had no reason to believe that Cardwell was armed and, when the frisk
revealed no weapons, the police simply continued "looking for contra-
band in [Cardwell's] jacket, and they clearly exceeded the scope of a per-
missible Terry weapons pat-down in doing so."1 7
Cardwell emphasizes that an analysis of the propriety of a Terry stop is
a multiple step inquiry. Even if a brief detention is justified under the
circumstances, the permissible scope can be exceeded by a search that is
no more than a fishing expedition.
In the absence of reasonable suspicion, police authority to detain an
individual remains highly circumscribed, even in the context of otherwise
legal driver's license checks. The limits of such checks as a law enforce-
ment tool were considered in Garcia v. State.'8
In Garcia, the defendant was under surveillance for possible drug traf-
ficking. Officers stopped him for a driver's license check. During this
stop, the officers noticed a white powdery substance in the defendant's
wallet. The officer subsequently arrested Garcia for possession of a con-
trolled substance.
In response to Garcia's motion to suppress, the State argued that he
was legally stopped pursuant to a state statute that allows any peace of-
ficer to stop any motor vehicle for a license check. 19
The court rejected the state's position and held that the statute was not
a license to conduct narcotic fishing expeditions.20 The stop could have
been justified as a Terry stop if the officers could have articulated a rea-
sonable suspicion. However, the state could produce no information
linking Garcia to the drugs or to any specific criminal activity. Conse-
quently, the evidence obtained from the stop should have been
suppressed. 21
Garcia illustrates an investigative detention's limits. Although the
Texas courts are flexible in reviewing the surrounding circumstances,
15. Id. at 566.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 567.
18. 894 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
19. Id. at 867 (citing TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. Art. 6687b, § 13 (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
20. Id.
21. Id at 869.
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those limits cannot be avoided by a driver's license check or any other
permitted detention.
The final significant treatment of the investigatory detention issue dur-
ing the survey period came in Melugin v. State.22 This case involved a
common fact pattern in the investigative detention jurisprudence-an air-
port stop.
Houston police stopped Melugin at Houston's Intercontinental Airport
under the following circumstances: Melugin appeared nervous; he paid
cash for his plane ticket; he carried his bags on the plane; and he arrived
at the gate after boarding had begun.
The court rejected the state's claim that the seizure of Melugin-which
revealed a bulge in his pants that turned out to be a packet of cocaine-
was the product of a valid investigative stop.2 3 Indeed, were the result
otherwise, nearly every harried business traveler would be subject to a
"stop and frisk." Melugin emphasizes that such stops, though widely per-
mitted in a variety of circumstances and an important component of the
war on drugs, must still be supported by "specific, articulated facts that, in
light of the officer's experience and general knowledge, lead him to the
reasonable conclusion that the suspect is connected to ongoing criminal
activity."24
C. PLAIN FEEL EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Although the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to make all
warrantless searches presumptively unreasonable, there exists a variety of
recognized exceptions. One exception of recent vintage is the so-called
plain feel doctrine, which was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson.2 5 This doctrine, a tactile analog to plain
view, allows an officer, while conducting a lawful frisk, to seize without a
warrant "an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately
apparent. "26
In Graham v. State,27 the Dallas Court of Appeals considered the scope
of this doctrine. Graham was stopped for a motor vehicle violation and
subjected to a pat-down search after he appeared to reach under his seat
for a weapon. The officer discovered no weapons on Graham's person
but noticed a "crackling" sound in Graham's pocket that felt like two
small objects, and upon further squeezing, "like little capsules or pills or
something like that."'28 The capsules turned out to contain cocaine.
The Dallas court reviewed the trial court's denial of a motion to sup-
press and held that the officer had exceeded the scope of the plain feel
22. 908 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Houston 1995, no writ).
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 15.
25. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
26. Id. at 2137.
27. 893 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
28. Id. at 6.
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exception by his persistent squeezing and rubbing of Graham's pocket.29
The key to proper application of the exception, according to the court,
was the notion that the identity of whatever is felt be "immediately ap-
parent. '30 Without such immediacy, the plain feel exception does not ap-
ply. The officer's persistent rubbing and squeezing made clear that the
character of the pills in Graham's pocket was not immediately apparent.
D. BODILY SEARCHES
In State v. Avila, the El Paso court considered the propriety of the most
invasive type of search contemplated by the Fourth Amendment-a
search inside a defendant's body.31 Avila was indicted for murdering his
wife during an exchange of gunfire in which he received a bullet wound in
the abdomen.
A few days after the shooting, local police obtained a warrant to re-
move the bullet from Avila by surgery. Emergency room physicians ex-
tracted the bullet.
The trial court granted a motion to suppress. 32 The state appealed and
the El Paso court held that the "search" was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, 33 relying on the test set forth in Winston v. Lee.34 In Win-
ston, the Court set out six factors for consideration in determining the
reasonableness of a surgical search:
1. Probable cause and warrant.
2. Life and health of suspect.
3. All reasonable medical precautions, no unusual or untested
medical practices.
4. Performed by a physician in a hospital according to accepted
medical practices.
5. Unjustified if search endangers life or health of the accused.
6. The extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary inter-
ests, personal privacy, and bodily integrity. 35
The Avila court concluded that the surgical procedure was reasonable
under the Winston factors.36 The procedure was described by the attend-
ing physician as routine and required no unusual procedures. A local
anesthetic was used and the procedure took an hour.
In rejecting Avila's argument, the court also rejected creating a new
Texas rule for surgical searches which would require an adversarial hear-
ing before such a search.37 Such a hearing is a requirement in other juris-
dictions, the court observed, but it could find no Texas case supporting
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id.
31. 910 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ).
32. Id. at 507.
33. Id. at 511.
34. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
35. Avila, 910 S.W. 2d at 509-10.






A pretextual arrest has been defined as one accomplished for an ulte-
rior or unstated purpose. It has generally been held to violate the Fourth
Amendment, although as the Court of Criminal Appeals observed during
the Survey period, Texas law on the issue has not been "a model of clarity
and concise legal analysis." 39
Crittendon involved a challenge to an allegedly pretextual arrest under
the Texas Constitution. The defendant was stopped in his car for failing
to make a proper signal before a right turn. The officer discovered nar-
cotics on his person. The defendant argued that his detention by the of-
ficer was a pretext used to verify no more than a "hunch" that he might
have illegal drugs.40
The issue before the court was whether an officer's subjective motiva-
tion should be an issue in evaluating a claim of a pretextual arrest or
whether the focus should be solely on the objective circumstances sur-
rounding the detention.41 The court, having previously ruled that the fed-
eral constitution mandates an objective analysis, 42 held that the Texas
Constitution requires no different result.43
The court's ruling effectively eliminates the pretext doctrine from
Texas jurisprudence. If the objective circumstances surrounding an arrest
are the sole focus of both a federal and state constitutional analysis, there
can never be an inquiry into the officer's "real" intent and thus never a
claim of pretext. Crittendon reveals that, in spite of Autran,44 the Court
of Criminal Appeals will rarely be inclined to interpret the Texas Consti-
tution differently from its federal counterpart.
F. INVOKING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Under long-standing Texas law, once a suspect makes an ambiguous
request for counsel, all substantive questioning must cease and the officer
must limit his inquiry to determining whether the suspect indeed intends
to invoke his right to counsel. 45 In State v. Panetti, the San Antonio Court
of Appeals abandoned this rule, in a case remanded from the Court of
Criminal Appeals.46
In Panetti, a capital murder suspect asked the interrogating officer:
"Should I be answering these questions without my lawyer, or does it
38. Id
39. Crittendon v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995, no writ).
40. Id. at 669.
41. Id. at 671.
42. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Grim. App. 1992, no writ).
43. Crittendon, 899 S.W. 2d 668.
44. See supra text accompanying note 3.
45. Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856
(1987).
46. 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref'd).
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matter or I mean, I-I give up, anyway."'47 This statement qualified as an
ambiguous request for counsel. In a previous unpublished opinion, the
court had ruled that the subsequent incriminating statements were inad-
missible under Russell.
However, the underpinning for the Russell jurisprudence was federal,
not Texas law. That federal law changed with the United States Supreme
Court decision in Davis v. United States.48 The rule in Davis permits sub-
stantive questioning until the suspect unequivocally invokes his right to
counsel.49 Thus, the basis for the Russell rule no longer exists and the
Panetti court found no reason under the federal constitution to suppress
the confession.
Moreover, the court also declined to find a basis for suppressing the
confession under the Texas Constitution. Without any substantive analy-
sis, the court simply declared that "we see no reason to adopt the Russell
rule as a matter of state law. ... .50
A different analysis has been applied in cases where the suspect makes
an unequivocal request for a lawyer. In such a circumstance, all interro-
gation of the suspect must cease. 5' The Texarkana Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed this distinction during the Survey period in Rule v. State.52 The
Rule court noted that the interrogation must cease even if the interroga-
tion is initiated by the suspect, unless there is a clear showing of waiver.53
G. THE REQUIREMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION
Because the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures applies only to governmental acts, and not those of
private actors, the state will occasionally have the opportunity to argue, in
defense of an otherwise unreasonable search, that the search was con-
ducted by a private citizen. Such a case arose during the Survey period in
Riordan v. State.54
In Riordan, police officers conducted a warrantless search of the de-
fendant's home while he was at work. Unable to sustain the search based
on consent provided by an elderly neighbor, the state argued that the
defendant's twelve year old son, in a unique display of filial loyalty, actu-
ally conducted the search for narcotic contraband. If the son was acting
on his own, the contraband discovered on the premises was admissible. 55
If he was acting as "agent" for the state, the evidence obtained should
have been suppressed.56
47. Id. at 282.
48. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
49. Id.
50. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d at 284.
51. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
52. 890 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ ref d).
53. Id. at 163.
54. 905 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ).




The court articulated a two part test for determining if Riordan's son
was an agent for the state: (1) whether the police participated in the in-
trusive conduct and (2) whether the private citizen intended to assist the
police or further his own ends.57 The court concluded that since the po-
lice summoned the boy home, they effectively participated in the intru-
sive conduct.5 8 Moreover, the boy's compliant and speedy exposure of
his father's narcotics suggested that he was not merely acting for his own
purposes. 59
H. VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONS
The rules governing admissions of a confession in a Texas Court have
in large measure been codified in Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. During the Survey period, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held, in Garcia v. State, that the provisions of Article 38.22 must
be strictly construed. 60
In Garcia, the defendant signed a statement implicating himself that
contained an acknowledgment of the right against self incrimination, the
right to counsel, and the other rights required to be "on the face" of an
admissible confession under Article 38.22. However, the statement did
not show, on its face, waiver of each of those rights.6 ' The state argued
that, when Garcia initialed each sentence describing one of his rights, he
effectively "waived" them under Article 38.22.
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this argument and held that
the requirements of Article 38.22 were not satisfied because an express
waiver of each right was not apparent on the face of the confession. 62
The court specifically avoided the issue of whether "substantial compli-
ance" will ever justify the mandates of Article 38.22.63 Given Article
38.22's clear language-and the relative ease of full compliance-it seems
unlikely that the high court will ever opt for a "substantial compliance"
approach.64
II. FEDERAL CASES
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
1. A "Categorical Exception" to the Exclusionary Rule
During the Survey period, the Supreme Court decided the case of Ari-
zona v. Evans-a case which established a "categorical exception to the
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Riordan, 905 S.W.2d at 773.
60. No. 71417, 1994 WL 706957 (Tex. Crim. App.-Dec. 21, 1994, reh'g granted) (not




64. But see Williams v. State, 883 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ ref'd)
(holding substantial compliance sufficient under Art. 38.22).
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exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees. '65
Defendant Evans was stopped by a Phoenix police officer for driving
the wrong way on a one-way street. The officer entered Evans' name into
a computer terminal located in the officer's car. The officer learned from
the computer that there was an outstanding warrant for Evans' arrest,
and Evans was arrested. A bag of marijuana was discovered during a
search of Evans' car after the arrest and Evans was charged with posses-
sion of marijuana.
The warrant utilized to arrest Evans, however, had been quashed 17
days prior to Evans' arrest. Evans therefore argued that the marijuana
seized "should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. ' 66 The
trial court granted the motion to suppress, the Arizona Court of Appeals
reversed that decision, and the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to deter-
mine whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence
seized incident to an arrest resulting.from an inaccurate computer record,
regardless of whether police personnel or court personnel were responsi-
ble for the record's continued presence in the police computer. '67
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the U.S. Supreme Court uti-
lized US. v. Leon68 to reverse the decision of the Arizona Supreme
Court. Leon involved "a police search in which the officers had acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a neutral
and detached Magistrate, that later was determined to be invalid."'69 In
Leon, "[o]n the basis of three factors,70 [the Supreme Court] determined
that there was no sound reason to apply the exclusionary rule as a means
of deterring misconduct on the part of judicial officers who are responsi-
ble for issuing warrants, ' 71 and the Court went on to conclude that
"'[e]xcluding the evidence can in no way affect [the officer's] future con-
65. 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1193 (1995).
66. Id. at 1188. Evans argued before the trial court that the marijuana seized should
be suppressed because "the purposes of the exclusionary rule would be served here by
making the clerks for the court, or the clerk for the Sheriff's office, whoever is responsible
for this mistake, to be more careful about making sure that warrants are removed from the
records." Id.
67. Id. at 1189. It should be noted that the state of Arizona conceded that Evans'
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at n.1.
68. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
69. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191.
70. The three factors relied upon in Leon were set forth by the Evans Court as follows:
First.... the exclusionary rule was historically "designed to deter police mis-
conduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." Second,
there was "no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these
actors requires the application of the extreme sanction of exclusion." Third,
and of greatest importance, there was no basis for believing that exclusion of
evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would have a significant deterrent ef-
fect on the issuing judge or magistrate.




duct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.' 72 Similarly, in
Evans, the Court stated that "[i]f court employees were responsible for
the erroneous computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would
not sufficiently deter future errors so As to warrant such a severe sanc-
tion. '73 The Court went on to apply the three factors from Leon:
First, as we noted in Leon, the exclusionary rule was historically
designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by
court employees. Second, [Evans] offers no evidence that court em-
ployees are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or
that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the ex-
treme sanction of exclusion ....
Finally, and most important, there is no basis for believing that
application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have
a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the
police that a warrant has been quashed. Because court clerks are not
adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime, they have no stake in the out-
come of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion of
evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals from failing
to inform police officials that a warrant had been quashed.74
Finally, the Evans Court stated that if the person responsible for the error
appearing on the police computer was a court clerk, "application of the
exclusionary rule also could not be expected to alter the behavior of the
arresting officer."'75 The Court also noted the lack of any "indication that
the arresting officer was not acting objectively reasonable when he relied
upon the police computer record" 76 and concluded that "[a]pplication of
the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary
rule for clerical errors of court employees. '' 77 It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Evans Court declined to address the issue of whether the
same analysis applied in Evans should be applied "to determine whether
the evidence should be suppressed if police personnel were responsible
for the error."'78
2. Random Drug Testing of Student Athletes and the Fourth
Amendment
The controversial topic of random drug testing was addressed during
the Survey period by the Supreme Court in Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton.79 Acton centered around the constitutionality of randomly drug
testing student athletes. In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the
Court found that the random drug testing policy at issue to be
72. Id. at 1192 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting))).
73. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193.
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1194.
77. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-22).
78. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194, n.5.




After noticing an increase in drug use by students during the middle to
late 1980s, the Vernonia school district in Oregon implemented its "Stu-
dent Athlete Drug Policy" in the fall of 1989.81 Under the Policy, which
applied to "all students participating in interscholastic athletics,"
"[sltudents wishing to play sports must sign a form consenting to the test-
ing and must obtain the written consent of their parents." 82 At the begin-
ning of a season for a particular sport, the athletes for that sport are
tested. Ten percent of the athletes are then randomly tested once each
week during the season.8 3 The testing requires the student to be tested to
provide a urine sample. 84 Because seventh-grader James Acton and his
parents refused to sign the consent forms for the testing, Acton was de-
nied the opportunity to play football at his school, which prompted the
filing of this lawsuit by the Actons.8 5 The trial court denied the Actons'
claims and dismissed the lawsuit.86 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed
this decision and held "that the Policy violated both the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments and Article I, Section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution. 87
The U.S. Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by noting that
"state-compelled collection and testing of urine, such as that required by
the Student Athlete Drug Policy, constitutes a 'search' subject to the de-
mands of the Fourth Amendment. 88 The Court then stated that the "ul-
timate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is
'reasonableness"' and that
in a case such as this, where there was no clear practice, either ap-
proving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the
constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search
meets the reasonableness standard "'is judged by balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its pro-
motion of legitimate governmental interests.' 8 9
The Court then considered various factors to reach the conclusion that
the Policy at issue was "reasonable and hence constitutional." 90 Factors
considered by the Court included "the decreased expectation of pri-
80. Id. at 2396.
81. Id. at 2388-89.
82. Id. at 2389.
83. Id.
84. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.




89. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Deleware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979))).
90. Id. at 2396.
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vacy,91 the relative unobtrusiveness of the search,92 and the severity of
the need met by the search 93."' Of the factors discussed by the Court, the
most significant factor was that "the Policy was undertaken in furtherance
of the government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as
guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care."' 94 However, the
Court did "caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing
will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts. '95
3. The "Knock and Announce" Principle is an Element of the Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness Inquiry
In the case of Wilson v. Arkansas,96 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Thomas, held that the "common-law 'knock and an-
nounce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment."97
Defendant Wilson sold narcotics to an informant over a two month
period. After obtaining a warrant to search Wilson's home, police arrived
at Wilson's home and found the main door open. The officers entered
the home through an unlocked screen door, "identified themselves as po-
lice officers and stated that they had a warrant. s98 The officers then
seized various narcotics found in the home. 99
Wilson moved to suppress the evidence at trial based on various theo-
ries. One of Wilson's theories was that the search was invalid because
"the officers had failed to 'knock and announce' before entering her
91. For their own good and that of their classmates, public school children are
routinely required to submit to various physical examinations, and to be vac-
cinated against various diseases ....
Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student ath-
letes ....
By choosing to 'go out for the team', they voluntarily subject themselves to
a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.
Id. at 2392-93.
92. Under the District's Policy, male students produce samples at a urinal along
a wall. They remain fully clothed and are only observed from behind, if at
all. Female students produce samples in an enclosed stall, with a female
monitor standing outside listening only for sounds of tampering .... Under
such conditions, the privacy interests compromised by the process of ob-
taining the urine sample are in our view negligible.
Id. at 2393.
93. [T]his program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes,
where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with
whom he is playing his sport is particularly high. Apart from psychological
effects .... the particular drugs screened by the District's Policy have been
demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes."
Id. at 2395.
94. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
95. Id.
96. 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995).
97. Id. at 1915. The knock and announce principle generally requires a law enforce-
ment officer to "announce his presence and authority" before breaking open the doors of a
dwelling. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1915-16.
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home". 100 The trial court denied Wilson's motion to suppress, and the
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Wilson's conviction. 1 1 The Arkansas
Supreme Court also "rejected [Wilson's] argument that 'the Fourth
Amendment requires officers to knock and announce prior to entering
the residence"' 102 and "concluded that neither Arkansas law nor the
Fourth Amendment required suppression of the evidence. '10 3 Because
there was "conflict among the lower courts as to whether the common-
law knock-and-announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness inquiry," the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.104 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "[a]n examination of the
common law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the reasonable-
ness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether law en-
forcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to
entering.' ' 05 However, the Court also explicitly stated that there does
not have to be an announcement before every entry.' 0 6 After detailing a
few examples from jurisprudence of when announcement need not be
made, 0 7 the Court stated that it was leaving "to the lower courts the task
of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 08 Additional litigation on
this issue can be expected.
B. FIFTH CIRCUIT CASES
1. The Warrantless Use of Thermal Imagers
The utilization of advanced technology by law enforcement personnel
in their efforts to stop crime continues to raise interesting issues regarding
whether the particular technology used in a given situation has violated a
defendant's expectation of privacy. During the Survey period, the Fifth
Circuit had occasion to address such a situation. In U.S. v. Ishmael,10 9 the
technology at issue was the thermal imager." 0 In Ishmael, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that "the warrantless use of a thermal imager in an 'open field'
does not violate the Fourth Amendment."'
100. Id. at 1916.
101. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916.




106. Id. at 1918.
107. Such as "under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence" or "in cases
where a prisoner escapes from [an officer] and retreats to [the prisoner's] dwelling." Id. at
1919.
108. Id.
109. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
110. A thermal imager detects differences in surface temperature of targeted objects
and displays those differences through a viewfinder in varying shades of white and gray. In
other words, a warm object will appear white on the device's viewfinder, whereas a cool
object will appear gray. The device can record its readings on a standard videocassette.
Id. at 851-52.
111. Id. at 853.
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The Ishmaels owned land which contained a mobile home and a large
steel building. Based upon information learned from a confidential
source, from physical entrances onto the land, and from other investiga-
tory techniques, DEA officers began to suspect that the Ishmaels were
cultivating marijuana in a structure located underneath the steel build-
ing.11- The DEA officers utilized a thermal imager while flying 500 to
1000 feet above the Ishmaels' property in a helicopter and while entering
the Ishmaels' property on foot and determined that "an unusual amount
of heat was emanating from the substructure and the ground adjacent to
it.'' 11 3 These findings, along with other information gathered by DEA
officers, were utilized "to obtain a warrant to search the steel building
and its substructure on the Ishmaels' property."' 114 Several firearms and
770 marijuana plants were found as a result of the search, and the
Ishmaels attempted to suppress the evidence found. The Ishmaels "ar-
gued that the readings from the thermal imager constituted an unconsti-
tutional search and that, without those readings, the DEA did not have
probable cause to obtain a warrant." 115 The district court agreed and
granted the motion to suppress. 116
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit focused on the case of Katz v. U.S., 117
which sets forth the two-prong test to be utilized in any Fourth Amend-
ment surveillance case "for determining whether a warrantless search vio-
lated a defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy: the defendant must
have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and that expectation
must be one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.""l18 The
Court found that the first prong-a subjective expectation of privacy-
was satisfied by the Ishmaels.119 However, as to the issue of "whether the
government's intrusion on the Ishmaels' subjective expectation of privacy
with a thermal imager is a reasonable one,"' 20 the Court found that it
was. According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Dow Chemical Co. v.
U.S.,121 as relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in Ishmael, the "crucial inquiry,
as in any search and seizure analysis, is whether the technology reveals
'intimate details." ' 122 The Fifth Circuit found that the thermal imager
"poses no greater intrusion on one's privacy than a precise mapping cam-
era, an electronic beeper, or a pen register."'1 23 The Court also found the
"manner in which a thermal imager was used in this case [to be] equally
112. Id. at 851.
113. Id. at 851-52.
114. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 852.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
118. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 853 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
119. Id. at 854-55.
120. Id. at 855.
121. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
122. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 (citing Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238).
123. Id. at 856. A thermal imager "does not send any beams or rays into the area on
which it is fixed or in any way penetrate structures within that area." Id. (quoting U.S. v.
Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D. Haw. 1991)).
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significant in assessing the reasonableness of the intrusion" in that "the
officers never physically invaded the Ishmael's residential or commercial
curtilage". 124 Finally, the Court also stated that the fact that the steel
building at issue "stood in an open field" meant that "the officers in this
case were entitled to observe the steel building either by air or on
foot". 12 5 The Court therefore concluded "that the DEA's warrantless use
of a thermal imager in this case was not an unconstitutional search" and
"that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant.1 26
2. Standing to Contest Search of Another's Hotel Room
The issue of whether an individual had standing to contest the search of
another's hotel room was addressed during the Survey period in the case
of U.S. v. Wilson. 127 In Wilson, a U.S. Postal Inspector developed infor-
mation which led him to believe that defendant Wilson was in possession
of stolen mail and that Wilson could be found in a particular hotel room
in Arlington, Texas.' 28 The inspector and an Arlington police officer ar-
rived at the hotel room and were invited inside by James Stiles, the guest
to whom the room was registered.'2 9 It is important to note at this point
that "Stiles had resided in the hotel room for three years" and that "Wil-
son had slept in Stiles' hotel room the previous night with Stiles' permis-
sion.' 30 After learning that Wilson was in the bathroom and making him
come out of it, the police officer proceeded to make a "protective
sweep"'131 of the room, and when he stepped into the darkened bath-
room, the officer was able to view a checkbook located inside a trash
can.' 32 After discovering the checkbook, and after Wilson, Stiles, and
Stiles' girlfriend all denied knowledge of the checkbook, the officers ob-
tained permission from Stiles' to conduct a complete search of the room,
which Stiles gave in writing.' 33 Wilson then gave a handwriting sample to
the Inspector, and he also accompanied the Inspector to the Inspector's
office.134 At the Inspector's office, Wilson "gave an oral and written con-
fession to having possession of the stolen mail."'1 35 Wilson was ulti-
mately "indicted for possession of stolen mail, to wit: a personal check
which had been mailed ... in a letter or parcel.' 36 Wilson's motion to
124. Id.
125. Id. at 857.
126. Id.
127. 36 F.3d 1298 (5th Cir. 1994).
128. Id. at 1301.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. "A 'protective sweep' is a quick and limited search of a premises, incident to
an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly
confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding."
Id. at 1305-06.
132. U.S. v. Wilson, 36 F.3d at 1301.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1301-02.
135. Id. at 1302.
136. Id. at 1301.
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suppress the checkbook was denied because the "district court found that
Wilson had no standing to contest the search because he had no expecta-
tion of privacy in Stiles' hotel apartment."'1 3
7
The Fifth Circuit relied upon Minnesota v. Olson138 to determine that
Wilson had "standing to challenge the search and seizure of the check-
book."'1 39 Relying upon the following language from Olson-"status as
an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of
privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able"14 0-the Fifth Circuit noted that Stiles had lived in the hotel room
for approximately three years, that "Wilson was an overnight guest in
Stiles' 'home""141, and the Court concluded that Wilson therefore "had an
Olson expectation of privacy."'1 42
As to the warrantless seizure of the checkbook, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that "the checkbook was not admissible under the 'inevitable dis-
covery' doctrine,"'143 that because the "search of the hotel room was not
made as an incident to an arrest ... it does not fit within the 'protective
sweep' exception to the warrant requirement", 44 and that the "check-
book was not in plain view in the bathroom."'1 45 The Court therefore
held that the "seizure of the checks was unreasonable and was therefore
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment."' 46
3. The Admissibility of Polygraph Tests
One of the more controversial subjects in the area of American juris-
prudence has been whether the results of polygraph tests should be ad-
missible in a court of law. Until the precedent setting case of U.S. v.
Posado,147 the Fifth Circuit, "with few variations, has unequivocally held
that polygraph evidence is inadmissible in a federal court for any pur-
pose."'1 48 However, in Posado, the Fifth Circuit "remove[d] the obstacle
of the per se rule against admissibility"' 49 and in so doing "opened the
137. U.S. v. Wilson, 36 F. 3d at 1302. The trial court also determined that "because
Stiles subsequently consented to the search, it was clear that the checkbook would ulti-
mately have been discovered." Id.
138. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
139. U.S. v. Wilson, 36 F.3d at 1303.
140. Olson, 495 U.S. at 96-97.
141. U.S. v. Wilson, 36 F.3d at 1303.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1305.
144. Id. at 1306.
145. Id.
146. U.S. v. Wilson, 36 F.3d at 1306. The Court also found that "Wilson's confession
resulted from an exploitation of the illegally seized checks". Id. at 1308. Therefore, "the
admissibility of the confession falls with that of the checkbook." Id.
147. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995). In Posado, three defendants had their luggage
searched by law enforcement personnel at an airport. In order to establish that they had
not consented to the search of their luggage before the bags were opened, the defendants
attempted to arrange for the introduction of the polygraph evidence at the pretrial hearing
on their motion to suppress the cocaine found in their luggage. Id. at 429-30.
148. Id. at 429.
149. Id. at 434.
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door to the possibility of polygraph evidence in certain circumstances.' 150
To reach this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit examined evidentiary principles
contained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 51 and the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Because it concluded that the district court
had "applied a per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence,"' 152 the
Fifth Circuit remanded the case back to district court "for consideration
of the evidentiary reliability and relevance of the polygraph evidence
proffered by the defendants under the principles embodied in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert."'1 53
150. Id. at 436.
151. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
152. Posado, 57 F.3d at 432.
153. Id. at 436.
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